Chris Mullin: No, we are not going to invade Zimbabwe. Indeed, the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) ruled that out some time ago. I agree with most of what the right hon. Member for Fylde (Mr. Jack) had to say, however. We see no sign that Zimbabwe is preparing for a fair election. As in the past, the electoral register contains thousands of ghost voters, while many people who are entitled to vote have been left off it. The registrar general is refusing to provide the Opposition with an electronic version of the register that can be checked. Journalists are being harassed, independent newspapers are being suppressed and opposition meetings are being broken up. As I say, we see no sign that Zimbabwe is preparing for a free election. We are watching closely and we shall not hesitate to share what we find with the right hon. Gentleman and the wider world.

Michael Ancram: Given the Minister's welcome of the result of the Spanish referendum, what is his real view of Prime Minister Zapatero's comment at the time that, under the constitution,
	"We will undoubtedly see European embassies in the world, not ones from each country . . . We will see Europe with a single voice in security matters."
	At the time, the Minister described that on the radio as a "complete myth", but was not his friend the Spanish Prime Minister, merely daring to tell a truth that the Minister and the Foreign Secretary are desperately trying to hide from the British people?

David Taylor: Bolivia is south America's poorest country, but the last regime made the situation worse by caving in to World Bank pressure to privatise water and sewerage services in exchange for financial assistance. Following huge public demonstrations, that privatisation has been reversed and the protesters now have ending the privatisation of electricity, gas and oil in their sights. Does my hon. Friend agree that to coerce the acquisition by foreign companies of an impoverished nation's vital resources is often morally wrong and economically pointless? It is also politically undesirable, in that it can destabilise poorer countries, and weaken a nation's democratic control over its affairs.

Douglas Alexander: Since the bomb attack that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February, Lebanese opposition politicians have worked closely together to demand a full investigation into the attack and the full implementation of the Taif accord. On 28 February, in the face of public protests following the attack, including a general strike, the Lebanese government resigned. As my noble Friend Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean made clear when she visited the Lebanon last week, the UK urges all parties in Lebanon to implement United Nations resolution 1559, which supports the sovereignty of Lebanon and the exercise of its rich tradition of democracy.

Douglas Alexander: I concur that real progress has been made in Lebanon. Our compass to guide us forward is UN Security Council resolution 1559, which made it clear that there should be respect for that country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence. It urged all remaining foreign forces to withdraw, and called for the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

Jack Straw: I am sure that I speak for the whole House in condemning utterly the terrorist outrage in Tel Aviv on Friday last, in which four Israelis were killed and many more were injured, and in sending our condolences to the Government and the people of Israel.
	The new President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, condemned that outrage in unequivocal terms last Friday, and he did so again at this morning's meeting of the London conference, which is being held at the Queen Elizabeth II centre, across Parliament square. In his opening address to that conference, President Abbas set out his plans greatly to improve the Palestinian Authority's security structures, with help from the international community. Co-operation with the Israeli security services has been already significantly strengthened.

Points of Order

John Bercow: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. While the Foreign Secretary is still in the Chamber and willing and able to give us his attention, do you agree that in light of the fact that the question on Sudan, which would have allowed contributions on the subject of Darfur, was not reached, it would be immensely helpful if the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister were minded to come to the House to make a statement about the continuing crisis in Darfur, which has both a humanitarian and a human rights character? Millions of people may wonder why, in the course of an hour, we were unable to debate a matter of the most momentous magnitude for the future of that country.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is trying to extend Question Time.

David Winnick: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I accept entirely what you said about "Yesterday in Parliament", but I want to get the record straight. Obviously, reports of the butchery that occurred appeared in newspapers, but no one has contradicted the fact that more than 100 Iraqis were murdered. I hope that you, Sir, were not indicating—I am sure that you were not—that the matter that I raised on a point of order did not take place.

Mr. Speaker: I was not doing that. The hon. Gentleman raised a point of order a week ago, so I thought that I would bring him up to date while I had the opportunity.

Bus Services (Quality Contracts Schemes)

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 360, in clause 8, page 4, line 29, at end insert 'in England and Wales'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
	No. 352, in page 4, line 34, at end insert 'in England and Wales'.
	No. 353, in clause 9, page 5, line 2, at end insert 'in England and Wales'.
	No. 354, in clause 9, page 5, line 4, at end insert 'in England and Wales'.

Christopher Leslie: I echo the comments made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). I am looking forward to a tranquil but quite long afternoon, looking at the weight of business in front of us.
	Clauses 8 and 9 create new judicial leadership roles in criminal and family justice, namely, the head of criminal justice and the head of family justice. The first role will be exercised by the Lord Chief Justice or a person appointed by him. The second role will be exercised by the president of the family division. Those new offices will exist in the judicial system of England and Wales only. In Scotland, such responsibilities are the preserve of the Lord President of the Court of Session, and new equivalent clauses are being tabled for Northern Ireland.
	While I understand the rationale for the amendments, I do not think that they are necessary, not least because clause 119 explicitly states that clauses 7, 8 and 9 extend only to England and Wales. There can be no possible ambiguity with the present titles in view of the extent provisions; they can apply only in the judicial system of England and Wales. The amendment would cause more confusion, as the statutory title Head Of Civil Justice, which is established separately under the Courts Act 2003, does not refer to England and Wales. That title is not "Head of Civil Justice in England and Wales", even though it extends only to England and Wales.
	So, first, as it is not necessary because of the nature of clause 119 and, secondly, for the sake of consistency with other statutory titles in the Courts Act 2003, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that the amendments are not necessary.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I accept his comments, and will ask in a moment for leave to withdraw the amendment.
	The Minister alluded to the size of the scrutiny that we have to carry out this afternoon. At the risk of straying a little from the precise matter under discussion, I should like to put it on record that it is unsatisfactory that we should have to consider hundreds of Government amendments at a late stage in the proceedings on the Bill. But that is not because the amendments are contentious; many of them are not. However, their sheer volume makes proper scrutiny extremely difficult. I hope the Minister will take that back when considering how Bills are proceeded with in future.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) for his comments, which echo the reasons why I saw fit to highlight the issue. I also agree with the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes). Subject to those matters, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Amendment made: No. 25, in clause 8, page 4, line 37, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Lord Chancellor'.—[Mr. Leslie.]
	Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: I welcome the creation and formalisation of the positions of deputy heads. In practice we have had a deputy head of criminal justice. There is ample evidence to show that that post was badly needed because of the over-burdening of the Lord Chief Justice with administrative work and the management of the courts. A deputy head of family justice has recently been created and I have no doubt that that is a desirable move as well. The formalisation of those posts is a sensible move, which I welcome.
	Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment made: No. 26, in clause 9, page 5, line 7, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Lord Chancellor'.—[Mr. Leslie.]
	Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Christopher Leslie: I understand that there is a sort of overflow of feeling from yesterday's proceedings on the part of some hon. Members, although I have to admit in my defence that I was not the Bill Minister for the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Therefore I will not be drawn into that, not least because we are talking about Government amendments Nos. 490 and 370, which are pretty far removed from that point. However, I understand the issue that has been raised.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) is correct. He rightly explained that the arrangements that are set out in the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, which we discussed yesterday, are   special. In any case, my understanding is that the rule-making arrangements in that Bill, for example, are UK-wide, not just England and Wales-wide, and that the same approach is taken with respect to the similar UK-wide rules in the Constitutional Reform Bill. If I am wrong, I apologise in advance to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed.

Christopher Leslie: At present, schedule 2 provides a uniform mechanism for making practice directions across all jurisdictions and in all levels of court. It provides for the Lord Chief Justice to make practice directions with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, except, as I explained earlier, where those directions relate to the application and interpretation of the law or judicial decisions.
	The exception to that general approach, agreed in the concordat, is where the practice directions relate to deciding the appropriate level of judge to hear particular classes of case. It was agreed that for those directions the Lord Chief Justice would be required only to consult with the Lord Chancellor rather than seek his concurrence. Amendments Nos. 371 to 375, agreed with the Lord Chief Justice, qualify the existing practice direction-making mechanisms in schedule 2 in relation to that class of practice directions.
	In cases where directions set out criteria for allocating judges to hear particular categories of case, the Lord Chancellor will be consulted rather than required to give consent. That is in recognition of the fact that such directions are essentially matters for the judiciary, after taking into account any ministerial views.

Dominic Grieve: I am mindful of what the Minister has said, but on reflection I wonder why it is felt that the Lord Chancellor needs to retain control over the allocation of judges to hear particular categories of case.
	I appreciate that the role of the Lord Chancellor will be to continue to ensure the smooth overall administration of the courts process. Also, I am obviously reassured by what the Minister said about the fact that the Lord Chancellor will not have the power to allocate a particular judge to a particular case. That is important, because, given the Government's wish to ensure judicial independence or a move towards the separation of powers—I prefer the expression "judicial independence"—any suggestion that a tame judge is being appointed to deal with a case that might be controversial for the Government must be avoided.
	Equally, however, I wonder to what extent it can be seen as part of administration, rather than simply the sensible working procedure of the courts, that the Lord Chancellor should be able to allocate particular categories of cases. Those who will know which judges are best suited to dealing with certain categories of cases are going to be the heads of division—or, indeed, the Lord Chief Justice. Why, then, the continuing need for the Lord Chancellor to make the decision, even if it is in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice?
	The reality, as I understand, is that the Government are keen to move towards greater flexibility—that is, judges moving around more between different categories of case, if such cases are in their expertise and, I dare say, those judges have received the proper training from the judicial studies board. In those circumstances, why not leave it to the Lord Chief Justice to make the decisions? Why involve the Lord Chancellor and give him a right of veto? After all, if the system is breaking down the Lord Chief Justice ought to be in a position to do something about it.
	I am probing a little. It would be helpful if the Minister would amplify his remarks.

Christopher Leslie: I understand the hon. Gentleman's points. Ever since the term "stipendiary magistrate" became "district judge (magistrates courts), it has been necessary to make the position clear and comprehensible. My understanding is that there is no maximum number of district judges and magistrates courts set out in statute and, not surprisingly, I do not have to hand the exact number that we have in England and Wales at the moment. Perhaps I can write to the hon. Gentleman on that point.
	I am aware of the hon. Gentleman's point on the geographical nature of the district judges. I do not think that there is any specific formality attached to the geographical area in a district judge's title. Nor do I think that anything formally limits them from being redeployed elsewhere, but if I am wrong, I shall put the correct answer in my letter to the hon. Gentleman.
	Question put and agreed to.
	Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: Yes, that is rather what it sounds like. It also has a slightly prissy tone because of the way in which it contrasts the senior court with other courts. As the Minister knows, judges from other courts are now invited to sit in the Court of Appeal and, sometimes, on judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court of Judicature.
	So, for all those reasons, I urge the Minister to drop the idea. We do not need the amendments, and if he wants to press on with them I shall vote against them unless he can provide me with an extraordinarily cogent reason for changing my mind.

Simon Hughes: These are not issues that will ultimately make a fundamental difference. This Bill has been thought about and talked about for years and years. The reform of the judicial system has been thought about for a long time. My judgment is that we ought to try to get the best possible outcome and the simplest structure.
	I want to deal with the two points raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. There might be a further debate later about whether we structure the court system hierarchically and vertically. Ultimately, we might end up with a supreme court, with the Court of Appeal below that and the senior courts below that. The words may change eventually.
	Divisions might also be considered. There are arguments for different divisions of the court system. There might well be an argument now for having an administrative division of the High Court. There is certainly an argument for reviewing where some of the boundaries come in work done. The family division is a relatively new one and is worth while. Eventually, we might amend the title of the Queen's bench division, because that is a general title relating to the famous courts of yore which used to sit Downstairs, but it does not mean much to someone who is not a lawyer and has not studied legal history. That is not an argument for changing it categorically.
	I shall end where I began, however. This is a sensible proposal for the time being. I am sure that, in time, a Government will say that further work needs to be done and the judges might say that they want to propose further reforms. Let us have one supreme court, let it be known as the supreme court, let it be recognised as the supreme court and let us have the courts under it regarded for the time being as the senior courts. I think that most people will understand what is meant by that.

John Redwood: I support my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr.   Grieve), who has been maligned in this short but interesting debate. What is in a name? It is tradition, history and continuity, which established who we are and where we come from. With the Government's hectic modernising reforms, particularly in the constitutional area, we worry that they do not have any sense of history or tradition or understanding of why things are as they or have been named as they were. They seem to want to root out everything that was not created after 1997.
	By defending some names, and the larger institutions that they represent in many cases, we are saying that all is not wrong because it was thought up a long time ago, because it has evolved and served us well over many centuries or because it has some idiosyncrasies or quirks that do not seem rational or logical to the modernising mind of Labour and new Labour. We are saying to the Government that they should pause. Do they really need to dream up this ghastly name today and shove it through so that we will be cursed for the weeks and months ahead, if not years, with having to call our courts "Senior"? I believe that is a word that the Americans use to describe pensioners, which creates an unfortunate impression for the important bodies that the Government are trying to transmute.
	I often feel that this Government are in the alchemy business, but they take gold and transmute it into base metal rather than the other way around. What is in the name is what we stand for, who we are and how these great institutions have come about. If we destroy the name and the institution at the same time, something magic has gone.

Christopher Leslie: I would not want to accuse the hon. Gentleman of trying to grab the headlines—certainly not in this debate, at least. My understanding is that many of the Royal Peculiar functions are already undertaken under prime ministerial patronage, but I will try to check on the point, in case I am wrong. The amendments that we are proposing in this group do not make any further changes in that respect; they are simply designed to amalgamate the ecclesiastical patronage arrangements of the Lord Chancellor with those of the Prime Minister. Other functions are more judicial in that they relate to appeals under legislation such as the Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533 and the Public Notaries Act 1843, so they are transferred in line with the ending of the judicial role and functions of the Lord Chancellor. The amendments also provide for the Chancellor of the High Court to delegate the function of hearing appeals to another judge.

Simon Hughes: I have a somewhat less esoteric question for the Minister, who I commend on his mastery of the brief in connection with such a detailed issue. The daffodil in my buttonhole suggests that I might be an Anglican, but I am part of the disestablished Church, not a member of the Church of England. Having said that, I do not believe that denominations are important. There is one Church and denominations have often been a curse, not a merit, of that Church.
	Given that we are talking about the transfer of ecclesiastical functions to the Prime Minister—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) said, there is a well established system of officials who deal with these matters—will the Minister give an assurance on the record that there will always be consultation with the "customers or clients", to use my right hon. Friend's words, or the parishioners before the Prime Minister makes any appointments under his new powers?

Christopher Leslie: I suspect that that will be the case. I can give that undertaking in so far as we do not propose making any changes to the practice of making those patronage appointments. It is simply a matter of the formality of who will make the appointments on the advice of the Prime Minister to the Queen.
	The third tranche of amendments in the group deal with the Lord Chancellor's powers to appoint and remove from tribunals that have a UK-wide jurisdiction. Amendments Nos. 399 and 430 transfer the Lord Chancellor's duty to consult the Secretary of State for Health or the chief medical officer in respect of certain tribunal appointments.
	The others deal with tribunals with a UK-wide jurisdiction or a jurisdiction covering more than one part of the UK. Those require special arrangements in respect of some appointing and delegating functions and removals from office. The power to remove usually lies with the Lord Chancellor, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, but in respect of Scottish members, removal should be with the agreement of the Lord President of the Court of Session; and in respect of Northern Irish members, removal should be with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. Those seem to me sensible and appropriate changes. The relevant judge in each case is referred to in the amendments as the "appropriate senior judge".
	The fourth group of amendments deal with miscellaneous technical changes to schedule 4. For example, amendments Nos. 442 to 444 provide for the Lord Chief Justice to appoint someone other than the Master of the Rolls to the post of head of civil justice, bringing the legislation into line with the appointment procedure for the heads of criminal and family justice in clauses 8 and 9, which we discussed earlier. Amendment No. 397 transfers to the Lord Chief Justice the Lord Chancellor's power to prescribe new business for the central office, which we will now call the senior courts. There are also a series of amendments to omit statutory references to the now redundant power of the Lord Chancellor to alter rules made by rule committees.

Jonathan Djanogly: The amendments mainly deal with concordat issues and for the most part are fairly innocuous. However, I was fascinated to learn a little more about the royal peculiars.
	Hidden away in this huge list is Government amendment No. 390, which the Minister has just explained. That would allow local authorities to set the fees for searches of the local land charges register. Opposition Members are not satisfied about the addition of this late amendment to the Bill. The Government have set aside little enough time for debate on this important and substantial measure, even without the introduction of this substantive provision on the final day of Committee. The amendment is not connected with the rest of the Bill, even though the Minister did his best to tie it all in.
	The Government's control of timetabling has collapsed over recent weeks, so perhaps I should not be surprised that they have lumped together land charge fees with the creation of the new supreme court. That approach, however, seems to be a little bit on the tacky side.
	The small amount of time made available for debate of this matter is especially inappropriate, as the provision is not without controversy. The Council of Property Search Organisations is the trade association for the property search industry. It, and other providers of property search information, have contacted various hon. Members to explain the difficulties associated with the proposed change.
	The Bill will require each local authority in England and Wales to specify the fees for services relating to local land charges. Such charges are matters of a public nature: they relate to property, and people interested in a property ought to be aware of the associated charges. Matters covered include tree preservation orders, planning obligations, enforcement notices and designation as a conservation area. Details of local land charges can be obtained either through an official search carried out by local authorities in accordance with section 9 of the 1975 Act, or by means of a personal search by an applicant under section 8 of that Act.
	The amendment does not apply to personal searches of the register, which the Department for Constitutional Affairs has said will be the subject of a further review. At   present, the Lord Chancellor sets the fees for the   different types of local land charge searches. The standard fees are £6 for an official search, and £11 for a personal search. The Government have made available draft guidance for proposed new charges.
	When setting their own fees, local authorities will have to ensure that, taking one financial year with another, those fees do not exceed the cost of providing the services in question. They will also have to take into account guidance from the Lord Chancellor. The draft guidance made available by the Government covers the calculation of costs, and related matters.
	The proposals have developed out of the 1997 review "Report of an Efficiency Scrutiny of Central Consent Regimes for Local Authorities" and the 2001 White Paper entitled "Strong Local Leadership, Quality Public Services". That sounds like a good new Labour tag if ever I heard one.
	The hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr. Borrow) introduced a private Member's Bill on this topic last year, but that was withdrawn when the Government announced their intention to bring forward an amendment such as the one under discussion today. The proposals reflect the fact that the cost of providing local land charge services varies considerably between authorities. That variation arises out of the different ways that local land charges registers are maintained. For example, that information may be held electronically or on paper.
	A key argument in favour of such a change would be the desirability of devolution from central Government, removing the need for local government to make applications for fee increases and for new central Government orders to be issued. The hope would be, equally, that requiring local authorities to set fees that reflect their own costs would encourage transparency and efficiency. The result ought to be lower charges for consumers.
	The Opposition are not opposed in principle to the idea of allowing local authorities to set their own fees in this context. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr. Hayes) introduced an amendment to that end to the Housing Act 2004. Although that amendment was withdrawn, we still have reservations about the detail and timing of Government amendment No. 390.
	If the Government are intent on allowing local authorities to set their own fees, they should go further in requiring local authorities to improve the services that they provide in relation to local land charges. According to CoPSO, some local authorities still take up to eight weeks to produce local land charges searches. If vendors have to provide local search results as part of home information packs from 2007 onwards—we could debate whether they should do so in the first place—that will only add to the importance of ensuring that local authorities can provide an efficient service. Simply allowing local authorities to set fees to cover their costs does not provide an incentive for them to improve services and move swiftly towards the full electronic delivery of property information.
	In accordance with the Government's draft guidance, local authorities cannot operate cross-subsidies to keep council tax down generally, to cover the cost of providing personal searches information—of course, that is specifically excluded from Government amendment No. 390—or to cover the costs of holding property information and generally running their local land charges departments. However, that must be seen in the context of some local authorities' very poor track records in providing at-cost services and transparent accounting.
	Will local authorities be able to set their fees to subsidise the cost of collecting and storing property information, providing personal search requests or carrying out other council services? Again, how will the Minister encourage poor-service councils to pull up their socks and start delivering value for money?
	It is essential that the Government make it clear that the intention behind devolving this power is to reduce costs and increase transparency for the benefit of local land charges customers, not to create a new source of local government revenue on the back of the service that local councils are required to provide by law. Will the Minister please guarantee that there will be a significant reduction in the costs of gaining access to local land charges information as a result of Government amendment No. 390?
	I make none those points in relation to local authorities out of a desire to attack local government. On the contrary, I have a great deal of sympathy for the difficulties faced by local authorities under the Government. Let us take local planning departments. Only before Christmas, the Government slipped out their latest stealth tax plans: a huge increase in planning fees charged to the public—up by an average of 39 per cent. from April—while cutting planning delivery grants to local planning departments, so that they see no real increase in their resources.
	Perhaps our biggest criticism relates to the timing of Government amendment No. 390. The Office of Fair Trading is presently conducting a market study of the property search industry that is due to report this summer. It is considering how consumers' needs are met and the structure of the property search market, as well as investigating complaints from property search companies about difficulties in gaining access to property information held by local authorities.
	The Government have already accepted the need to wait for the study's findings in relation to personal searches. Yet they are still forcing through Government amendment No. 390 today in relation to official searches, tacked on to a barely related Bill. Bearing it in mind that those proposals have been in circulation for a number of years, my hon. Friends and I suggest that it would be much more sensible to wait the relatively short time until the OFT report is published. That would allow for a single comprehensive review of local property search markets and the role of local authorities.

Roger Gale: Order. Before the hon. Gentleman goes too far down that road, it would be very good idea if the Committee were to stay in order and relevant to the amendments under discussion.

Simon Hughes: I shall be brief. I raised this issue in my last intervention on the Minister. First, I start from the presumption that it is reasonable to include such proposals in the Bill because it relates to the devolution of powers that were the Lord Chancellor's, although perhaps it could be argued that they could be included elsewhere. Legislation is often a vehicle to which appropriate things can be attached, as the vehicle goes past, but I understand that the Bill is not entirely inappropriate for such proposals.
	Secondly, I start with the presumption that local government should have much more power to raise its income, to spend it and to be much more free from Government interference, direction and control. People would be encouraged to vote if they thought that voting for local councils could make a big difference—and the bigger the difference, the better.
	The questions asked by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) have been raised with us generally, and I am sure that they have been raised with the Government. The Minister needs to assure us that the best value for money and the most efficient service to the consumer can be achieved. I appreciate that we will never get different local councils to carry out searches in the same number of days. There should be a maximum number of days, but the council's efficiency will determine how quickly it is done.
	If a council is not allowed to charge more than its costs, however, the only variable is the efficiency of that local authority in delivering that service at the cost that is worked out for the service as a whole. The variation cannot be great. We are talking about small sums. The land search charges cost pounds, not tens, twenties, fifties or hundreds of pounds, so we are talking about one of the smaller costs in the search for houses that goes on for so many people for so long. There are none the less real concerns. The more helpful the Minister can be, the better. If he can also refer the debate on this matter to his colleagues in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister who deal with local government so that we can be sure that, from the date of handover, there is some immediate scrutiny to ensure that an overview is taken of how local councils perform in the first few years of their new power, that would be encouraging.

John Redwood: It would be useful—if the Minister catches your eye again, Mr. Gale—if he gave us some idea of what range of charges we might be in for if the proposal is adopted. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), I have some doubts about the Government doing this now. The Conservative party favours more local autonomy, but it would be useful to know why now. It would certainly be useful to know what the consequences might be.
	I presume that the Minister has looked at the figures for the costs around the country, and it would be helpful to the Committee to know what the range is and what the biggest increase might be. We consider this important matter in the context of mortgages just having been regulated very expensively and clumsily; the threat or promise of sellers packs coming in, which may also be expensive and cumbersome for people who are selling their houses; and a big escalation in stamp duty.
	The costs of buying a house and moving have got a lot dearer. We a considering a very small element of the cost, but we should worry about any element of it, given the history under the Government of big increases in the costs of buying a home, particularly for those who are trying to buy their first home, against the background of a rising market and increasing tax and regulatory costs. It would be helpful to the Committee if the Minister gave us some guidance on average costs and the range of costs around the country, so that we know what we might be in for.

John Bercow: I am surprised that the Minister is surprised at the way in which my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon properly performed his Front-Bench duty. The Minister should not take offence. The policy may be right or it may be wrong, but it is, at least, a source of surprise to some of us that such matters have been included in the Constitutional Reform Bill. We had thought that the Bill covered a variety of matters of slightly greater long-term constitutional significance to the fabric of the United Kingdom than is epitomised by a debate on land charges.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Gentleman may be right, and perhaps I should not have used the word "surprised", because I am not shocked and aghast that the Opposition should have raised the matter. Given that we are discussing the functions of the Lord Chancellor and that one of them is to set local land charge fees, I am not astonished that we are discussing the matter today.
	The fact that the fees are crudely set centrally means that the Department for Constitutional Affairs cannot do anything but approximate what those fees should be. Widely varying methods are used to produce the information requested in exchange for those fees. Localised setting of fees will help, even in a small way, to improve transparency for local government, and it could be a spur to greater efficiency. The hon. Gentleman referred to the labour costs that go into the process of searches and so on and if there is better local accountability, in theory some local residents may query why charges are set at a higher level than in other areas that are more efficient and have lower charges.
	There is also scope for local authorities to be innovative in the way in which they deliver information about land. The right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) asked what is involved. We are talking about searches relating to restrictions and obligations on particular pieces of land or, more generally, inquiries about the status of land and whether it is a conservation area, is subject to enforcement notices, and so on.
	Local authorities may want to consider providing information through the internet and other electronic means instead of having a paper-based system. That might be a preferable route, and we should consider transferring the centralised fee-setting arrangements to local authorities without allowing them to make a profit from the arrangements. The Lord Chancellor will be able to issue guidance to local authorities to ensure that they are aware of their obligations under other legislation. The idea is not new. Its genesis dates from as long ago as 1997 and might not have been under the present Administration. I caution hon. Members about that in case they favoured the suggestion at that time.
	I hope that I have been able to answer some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon. There will be an opportunity for cross-subsidisation because there will not be a profit element. The time has come to give that small amount of extra freedom and flexibility to local government. We are discussing the functions of the Lord Chancellor, and now is the time to make the amendment.
	Amendment agreed to.
	Government amendment made: No. 492.
	Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: The hon. Gentleman is very kind. There are little excitements in life. A commendation the other day said how much better people do if they are brought up to read and explore books and to understand them. This is one example, which I share, of the excitement of finding an item of constitutional importance in a book. I commend it to the Committee.
	The schedule would amend clauses 1 and 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 by removing the references to the "lord chauncelior". Those clauses are very long. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell me what is left to us by way of protection. That was a huge issue yesterday, and it will properly be a huge issue for the Lord Chancellor and the judges of the supreme court and others in the future. It is very important to ensure that at any stage a judge can order that someone who has been detained is brought to court to give them a chance to have their say. I ask out of ignorance, because I have not investigated what amendments have been made to the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 before. I guess that we do not amend it often and that this is a rare moment in history, hidden away in schedule 4.
	The 1679 Act is
	"for the better securing the liberty of the subject and for prevention of imprisonments beyond the seas."
	In essence, clauses 1 and 2 provide for the body—the person—to be brought before a judge to ensure that they are detained lawfully. After the amendment of the Act by schedule 4, which will remove the most senior judge, the Lord Chancellor, what will we be left with in terms of the judges in front of whom a person detained can be brought? Which judges will have power to call for someone to be brought before them?
	The phrase that will be left in the Act appears to include judges generally. Does that mean, in the phraseology that the Minister used earlier, junior judges, such as a magistrate, a district judge or a local county court or Crown court judge? Would it include High Court judges? I hope so. Would it include Appeal Court judges? I suppose that it might. Would it include the Lord Chief Justice? I hope that it would, because we need to know that the most senior judge in the land has the power, if necessary, to use habeas corpus to ensure that citizens of this country retain their liberty.

Jonathan Djanogly: My hon. Friend makes a good point. I could add the Privy Council to his list because other Commonwealth countries could be included.
	As Lady Justice Arden told the House of Lords Select Committee that considered the Bill, a possibility has arisen of replacing the judicial oath with a new oath, although the Committee was divided on the merits of that proposal. In any case, the Government have pursued that option by drafting clause 14. With amendment No. 355, my hon. Friends and I are attempting to suggest a more appropriate replacement for the judicial oath than that proposed by the Government. We suggest that the oath should read:
	"I  . . . do swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign  . . . in the office of Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and that I will faithfully and at all times uphold the continued independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, in accordance with the laws and usages of this Realm."
	The first purpose of our amendment would be to bring strength and focus to the new oath. Both versions of the oath rightly refer to the Lord Chancellor's duty to uphold the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. However, our version would remove an unusual requirement for which the Government have provided. Their version means that the person taking the oath would effectively, and somewhat bizarrely, swear to uphold administrative efficiency. However, pursuing such an aim could prove to be at odds with protecting the overriding principles of judicial independence and the maintenance of the rule of law.
	Our version of the oath focuses on the key constitutional issues that should, above all else, remain the driving force behind the Lord Chancellor's actions. Our oath sets out clearly that whatever the pressures faced by a Lord Chancellor—be they political or otherwise—it is at all times his or her duty to uphold such vital constitutional principles. Underlining that duty becomes even more important in the wake of the Government's decision to override the clear view of the other place that the Lord Chancellor should remain a Member of that House and a person who has held judicial office or has senior legal experience.
	We have added the words
	"in accordance with the laws and usages of this Realm"
	to the oath. They mirror the wording of the judicial oath and highlight the need for the Lord Chancellor to respect both the laws of the country and, perhaps even more significantly in practice, all the traditional conventions that have been so important in shaping our constitution.
	The House is well aware of the cavalier manner with which the Government treat those important protections offered by custom and convention. It was very nearly the case that we were not able to have this debate on the Floor of the Chamber, as a result of the Government's disregard for convention.

Jonathan Djanogly: I thank my hon. Friend for his input and agree with him. It is highly debatable as to whether administrative efficiency should be included in the oath. I do not think that it should be.
	In this context, it should be clear why it is necessary to point out specifically the importance of abiding by the law and usages of this realm. As the noble and learned Lord Howe of Aberavon put it in the other place, our suggested wording would also provide a "desirable sense of continuity". We do not believe that a difficulty arises if the Lord Chancellor's oath in some way mirrors the judicial oath.
	The noble Baroness Ashton of Upholland raised that point for the Government on Report when faced with similar amendments tabled by Lord Howe. We do not accept that the wording of our amendment would result in ambiguity in relation to the reformed status of the office of Lord Chancellor, simply because the Lord Chancellor's oath bears some similarity to the existing judicial oath. On the contrary, we would welcome it if the Lord Chancellor were still to be reminded of his continuing duty with respect to the rule of law.
	Our amendment contains a specific reference to well and truly serving our sovereign. That again reflects words previously sworn by Lord Chancellors as part of the judicial oath. They would serve as an important reminder of the principle that justice in the United Kingdom flows directly from the Crown. I dare say that they would provide a much more fitting and British tone to the oath, by contrast with the Euro-friendly Government version. Perhaps they are ensuring that the oath is European constitution-compliant, although I am sure that they need not worry themselves about that becoming necessary.

Ross Cranston: I will on this occasion.
	I also talked about modern definitions, but there is no suggestion that we are excluding the notion of the laws and usages of the realm. Both oaths take into account defending the independence of the judiciary, which is fundamental. The objection seems to be to the words in relation to ensuring the provision of adequate resources. If there is one thing that we have learned from history, and one thing that we learn by examining the judicial systems of other countries, it is that courts cannot function effectively without adequate resources.

Ross Cranston: I did borrow the word, but I did not purloin it. The words
	"the duty to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and effective support of the courts"
	require the provision of adequate resources. There is no difference between us about the need for there to be adequate resources.

Ross Cranston: Does not the hon. Gentleman concede that if the Government do not appoint enough judges, build courts and provide staff for judges, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary will not be protected?

Peter Atkinson: I am delighted to support amendment No. 355, which gives a few traditionalists on this side of the Committee the opportunity to form a square against the horde of modernisers led by the Minister and ably supported by the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) and the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), who want to destroy the last vestiges of tradition that surround the law. I am not a lawyer—[Interruption.] I apologise to my north-east neighbour, the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). She has not spoken, so I was not about to blame her for this.
	It is important for people of this country who believe in the importance of the law that there should be some dignity and respect attached to it, because that gives it something additional to the normal run of life. It makes judges stand out; people talk about the majesty of the law. That is very important if one is to engender the respect of the population for the legal system and the judiciary. They need some traditions, and over the years we have been wiping those out. We wiped out the assizes, quarter sessions and all sorts of aspects of the tradition of the law and replaced it with things such as this rather dull and banal version of the oath that we see today.
	I remember the introduction of new rules and regulations about juvenile courts. The idea was to make them far more user-friendly for those who were brought before them. Judges and magistrates were made to sit informally in small rooms, and that was meant to help young offenders. Of course, the answer is that it did not. The respect of young offenders for the system of the courts and justice declined, as we have seen. It is ironic that the Government are now so fond of reversing that process by introducing naming-and-shaming antisocial behaviour orders.
	I agree with the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that the oath is banal and nonsensical. It is interesting to look at a copy of the Promissory Oaths Act 1868—one can get it online, believe it or not—and the original words. It says that the Lord Chancellor will swear that he or she
	"will do right to all Manner of People after the Laws and Usages of this Realm without Fear or Favour, Affection or ill will. So help me GOD."
	Those are ringing words—words of tradition—to be replaced by this banal oath whereby he promises to ensure the adequacy of curtains, drains or other things, as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said. I believe that we should resist this change, and I hope that my hon. Friends will push the amendment to a Division.

William Cash: Buried in this debate are some pretty important questions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Atkinson) has just pointed out. It is about the abolition of the traditional quality of the office of Lord Chancellor. In deliberations in Cabinet, certainly until the present Cabinet, the Lord Chancellor by any standards carried weight and authority second only to and possibly exceeding that of the Prime Minister when it came to matters of constitution including constitutional reform, which is the subject of this Bill. After all, the role of the Lord Chancellor, excluding his judicial functions, is to maintain the security of the constitution of this country, which is what this Bill is meant to be all about.
	So, having regard to the exchanges that we have just had on the Lord Chancellor's oath, it is something of a surprise that the proposed oath does not emphasise the responsibility to maintain the constitution of this land, including the supremacy of Parliament, and to protect it against invasions from international treaties—European treaties and the like. Article 1.6 of the European constitutional treaty—I do not know whether the Lord Chancellor had anything to say on the subject—makes it clear that the constitution has primacy over the laws of the member states in relation to the competences conferred upon it. That brings us straight to the function of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the European Court of Justice. The Court has increased competences. Article 1.20 makes that clear. The role of the Lord Chancellor in Cabinet ought to be to give advice to the Prime Minister as to the   impact of the European constitutional treaty on the constitution of this country, including the impact on the making of laws in this country. I do not know whether the present Lord Chancellor has done so; I know that Lord Kilmuir did.
	If there is inconsistency between the laws prescribed by this Parliament and the laws that emanate from the European Union, the rule of primacy under section 2 of the European Communities Act means that our laws would be overridden. In the context of the constitution, which ought to be a central question for this Constitutional Reform Bill, I would have expected the Lord Chancellor to point out that the European constitution in relation to the declaration made in respect of article 1.6 on the role of the European Court of Justice says that the case law relating to primacy shall be in accordance with the decisions of the Court of Justice. The European Court asserted in the Costa v. Enel case and the Simmenthal case and others that the constitution and the laws of the European Union override our constitution and all treaties and obligations.
	So we have a serious problem on our hands. I do not know why the oath does not include a reference to maintenance of the constitution as a prime function of the Lord Chancellor. It could be said that all this is wrapped up in the expression "the rule of law." We debated that earlier. I am glad to say that the Opposition and the Conservative party as a whole supported my Back-Bench amendment on what the rule of law meant. The amendment to clause 1 sought to include our Parliament and asserted that the rule of law included ensuring that the supremacy of Parliament was maintained. I wonder whether that is understood by the Minister, and whether he is prepared to concede that point in respect of the words "the rule of law."
	The Minister wrote to me the other day on the subject and said that he did not think that in the context of the Bill it was necessary to go into all these questions. Well, I am going into them now, and I would like an answer from the Minister. He does not think that it matters. Other people in the Committee and in the country at large are extremely concerned to know whether the rule of law includes maintaining the supremacy of Parliament.
	If the Minister considers the body of law that relates to the legislative supremacy of Parliament, which I do not need to go into in detail, thank heavens, today, it is abundantly clear that this Parliament has to be maintained as the legislative body for the nation, over and above prerogative and international treaties. That is what the rule of law means. That is what the Lord Chancellor is being required to swear he will maintain. I want to hear the Minister, in the light of his letter to me, assert that, and confirm that when the Lord Chancellor swears that oath regarding the rule of law, he is also swearing to maintain the supremacy of Parliament. It is an extremely simple point and I want to hear it from the Minister's lips. If he is not prepared to put it in writing, perhaps he will be a little more forthcoming on the Floor of the Committee. It is a central issue. It came up today in Foreign Office questions. It is a new primacy, a new treaty and a new doctrine that is being applied under the aegis of the European Communities Act 1972. I want a simple answer. Will the Lord Chancellor, when swearing the oath, be swearing as a matter of duty and perjury that he will uphold the supremacy of Parliament?
	Some people may say that this is just meandering round words, words, words. In the exchange with Alice in "Through the Looking Glass", we read that a word
	"means just what I choose it to mean . . . The question is . . . which is to be master—that's all."
	This is not just a jokey matter to be discussed flippantly on the Floor of the Committee. Over and over again we have tried to get a clear statement from the Government with respect to where we are going under the European Union Bill. We know that they are not disposed to tell us when the next stage will take place, but it is incumbent—

William Cash: I understand, Sir Alan, although we have a fair amount of time to consider these matters, which we were denied yesterday. The definition of "international court" also includes functions in pursuance of
	"a resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly of the United Nations",
	which anyone would regard as rather curious in the context of a judiciary whose independence, as a matter of duty and of oath, must be sustained by the Lord Chancellor.
	Let us put that in the context of what judicial independence means. I have set the framework and I am now leading up to that crucial question. In 1950 Lord Denning, no less, stated in a seminal lecture:
	"No member of the Government, no member of Parliament, and no official of any Government department has any right whatever to direct or influence or to interfere with the decisions of any of the judges."
	That is what is meant by the definition in the Bill. The oath refers to the upholding of the independence of the judiciary.
	This is not a light matter. Apparently, in 1994, a serious problem is supposed to have arisen when the president of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the then Lord Chancellor fell out over the question of judicial independence.

Greg Knight: Before my hon. Friend moves on, can he assist me with regard to the wording in the oath? Reference is made to the independence of the judiciary. Does he take that to mean the judiciary in Britain, or would it mean the judiciary worldwide? Would it encompass judges of the European Court, who some of us do not think are judges in the proper sense at all?

Peter Luff: That probably takes us rather wide of the clause. I would not have changed the status quo at all; I was entirely content with the status quo. I belong to the school of thought that says, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The speakership of the House of Lords was not broken and it did not need fixing. The Government have not really adduced an argument about why that should be changed.
	If we are to separate out the judicial role, I might understand that—I might regret it, but it is happening—but it does not necessary follow that that great historic symbol, the Lord Chancellorship and his role as the Chairman of proceedings in the House of Lords also needs to change. Frankly, as someone who saw Lord Mackay of Clashfern perform that role with great distinction, I am totally unpersuaded by the case for change, so perhaps the Government are throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
	The clause and schedule 5, to which it gives effect—at least, I think that it gives effect, depending on the reassurance that I get from the Minister—are a bridge too far. We need much more justification for a change that may appear trivial, but could lead to confusion between the two Houses and removes an ornament to the British constitution that does no harm and brings great pleasure, distinction and a sense of historic continuity.
	My final thought is that Parliament should treasure historic continuity whenever it possibly can; it should only throw away traditions and customs when it is forced to do so by changing circumstances. When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change. That is an important principle with small things and big things, and it should be applied now. I am not persuaded by the case for the clause or schedule 5.

Keith Vaz: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff), but he is wrong on this issue. The Minister was spot on in the way in which he introduced this new proposal. It cannot be right, surely, that a senior member of the Government should, in conducting his or her duties as a Cabinet Minister, come before the House of Lords and act as a Speaker for that House. That is what the hon. Gentleman proposes.
	It should be a matter for the House of Lords to decide how it elects the person who will chair its proceedings. It is right that we should modernise the role of Lord Chancellor. Of course, we are keeping the title, so the hon. Gentleman need not worry about that. We have still got that title—the campaign has been won—but the role has been modernised. As a part of that process, it is essential that the other place should be able to find and elect its own Chairperson, so that it is not chaired by a member of the Government who sits in the Cabinet and therefore cannot possibility be seen to be impartial in his or her work.

Keith Vaz: Well, the hon. Gentleman was not in his place earlier when we had a debate about names, and whether we should have an attachment to a name or to the functions of the office. It must be left to the other place to decide. I believe that the words "Mr. Speaker" mean the Speaker of the House of Commons, and I am sure that many other titles could be found, in ancient Acts of Parliament or elsewhere, to describe somebody who chairs the proceedings in the other place.
	In any case, the Chair in the other place should not be the Lord Chancellor. We have won the battle to retain the title of Lord Chancellor and we should let him get on with being the Secretary of State of a major Department. The other place should choose whom it wants to chair it. I hope that it does not use the same title as we have because it is special to the House of Commons, but it can use any other title it wants.

Alan Beith: I agree with the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), as I so often agree with him on the Constitutional Affairs Committee. The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff) is, uncharacteristically, behind the flow of events, not least in that we had a brief but enlightening debate on ecclesiastical patronage at the relevant point earlier this afternoon. I am entirely satisfied with the way in which the matter has been handled, as it was much in line with the evidence heard by the Committee.
	I should declare an interest on the matter of a Speaker for the House of Lords, as my wife is a member of the other place. The clause is necessary to allow the House of Lords to make its own choice of Speaker. If we do not accept the clause, certain functions will have to be exercised by the Lord Chancellor that the House of Lords might consider should be exercised by the person who is its Speaker—or whatever title is used. That is the main reason for this provision: it is not that the House of Commons is deciding who should chair proceedings at the other end of the building. However, I agree with the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire that significant disadvantages would arise should the Lords decide to call that person the Speaker. There are also some reasons in the history of that Chamber that make that title inappropriate. The role played by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords is very different from that played by any occupant of the Chair in this House. The role in the Lords is a much more restricted role. The other place may yet choose a different title and we have our own reasons for hoping that it does so.

Jonathan Djanogly: Clause 15 deals with the future of the speakership of the House of Lords. It introduces schedule 5, which provides for the replacement of references in primary legislation to the Lord Chancellor in his capacity as Speaker, with references to the title of "Speaker of the House of Lords". On Third Reading in the other place, Lord Falconer conceded that the choice of Speaker of the House of Lords was a matter for the other place alone. The Government's intention of course is that the provisions in the Bill—now clause 15 and schedule 5—would allow the House of Lords to choose whomsoever it wished to fill that role without a future need to amend primary legislation.
	It is worth briefly setting out the background to these provisions. The other place established a Select Committee in July 2003 for the purpose of considering future arrangements regarding the speakership. That   followed in the wake of the Government's announcement of their intention to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor. The Committee's report in November 2003 made a series of recommendations, including that a single secret ballot should be used to elect the Speaker, the Speaker's term would last for five years with the possibility of renewal and the Speaker's title should be "Lord Speaker".
	The report also recommended that the Speaker's ceremonial role should be retained as that which currently exists for the Lord Chancellor, and that the Speaker should welcome new Members and help them to learn the customs and traditions of the House. It said that the Speaker would play an important role in receiving and entertaining overseas Speakers and other parliamentarians visiting Westminster.
	A debate on the speakership was held in the other place during the Bill's Report stage. During that debate, Lord Campbell of Alloway moved an amendment on behalf of the Opposition to retain the Lord Chancellor as Speaker. Lord Kingsland eloquently set out the case for retaining the present position. He said:
	"I cannot allow the moment to pass without expressing a view about the Speakership of your Lordships' House. This is a very important issue which requires careful thought and upon which taking the wrong decision could change the whole character of the House. That is why I submit that the clause on the Speakership and the accompanying schedule should not remain part of the Bill."
	The Bill and the review of the speakership of the House conducted by Lord Lloyd of Berwick and his Committee were predicated on the assumption that the office of Lord Chancellor would no longer exist. However, their lordships' House has now determined not only that the office should continue to exist, but that the Lord Chancellor should remain in their lordships' House. Of course, owing to Government amendments that were agreed to in Committee in the Commons, we are now in the rather unhappy position that the Lord Chancellor will not necessarily have to be a Member of the other place. However, we are yet to hear their lordships' views on that.

Jonathan Djanogly: I think that Lord Kingsland was talking from a historical perspective. He was thinking about the sort of House that people had known and enjoyed and the unnecessary nature of the changes.
	The role of the Lord Chancellor remains and the official Opposition believe that it should include the speakership of the other place. Lord Kingsland said:
	"For my part, I wish to see the Lord Chancellor continuing in his historic role as Speaker of the House. The ancient office and high degree of that office reflect and embody the authority and precedence of this House."
	Removing the Lord Chancellor from his role as Speaker goes far beyond the sensible, incremental changes that have occurred in the other place, such as no longer requiring the Lord Chancellor to robe or preside at Divisions. As Lord Kingsland put it, the measure would be
	"a wholesale change that would dispense with the traditions of your Lordships' House and could see us moving towards a full-time Speaker with authority over the House." —[Official Report, House of Lords, 7 December 2004; Vol. 667, c. 885–6.]
	The Conservative party, like the Government, agrees that the decision about the speakership is ultimately one for the other place itself. The view that my hon. Friends and I are presenting in this debate reflect the views of Opposition peers during the Bill's passage through the other place, namely that the Lord Chancellor should remain Speaker in that House. Although the Government insist that the Bill does not compel the other place to remove the Lord Chancellor from the speakership, that important decision will effectively be taken before the other place can properly debate the proposals.
	While the other place has had to consider the question of who should be its Speaker, it is unfortunate to see a structure that has been little used in the Lords being put into play. It would be unwise to give the holder of the speakership of the Lords the title of "Speaker", because constitutionally speaking, he would not speak for peers. All peers constitutionally have a right of access to the sovereign, so the role of Speaker in the Lords is entirely different from that of Speaker in the Commons. To have competing claims on the role of Speaker can only lead to confusion. The term is confusing not just constitutionally, and hon. Members in the Committee understand full well what is going on in that regard, but for normal people as well. As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff) said in his eloquent speech, symbols matter. The confusion cannot be good for understanding how Parliament is run, which is surely an important part of our democracy.

Christopher Leslie: I heard the points raised by the hon. Members for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff) and for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), although I tend to agree more with the Chairman of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), and my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) in their interpretation of clause 15 and schedule 5. I assure the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire that they are adequately drafted. I was interested to learn that he was the first Parliamentary Private Secretary to a Lord Chancellor. I do not know whether a plaque has been put up in any corner of the building, or even in Selborne house on Victoria street, as a commemoration of that.
	Obviously, use of the word "Speaker" is of concern. Although the clause and schedule are entitled "Speakership of the House of Lords", it was, as the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed set out, for the purpose of finding a generic way of describing the aspects under consideration that we used the reference, first made in legislation in the Clerk of the Parliaments Act 1824, to the Speaker of the House of Lords. That is not necessarily of our choosing, and nor should it be taken that it is our preference for what the actual title should be in the other place. Their lordships have yet to give their view on their future arrangements, both for the practice of chairing and presiding over their proceedings and for the title.
	I am aware of legitimate concerns expressed by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee about duplicating a title from one House to another. As a member of the Executive, however, they will understand that it is not for me to dictate to Members of the other House our preference as a Government for what that title should be. I am quite sure that their noble lordships, in their usual manner, will listen carefully to the views expressed here.

Christopher Leslie: I understand the hon. Gentleman's desire in general for statute law clarification and codification to make for easy reading, and I apologise for the fact that that is not always the case. However, I am absolutely assured that the provisions set out in clauses 16, 17, 18 and 19 and schedule 6 achieve what we want them to achieve, and that they are clear to those who are versed in reading these matters.
	To elaborate somewhat, clause 16 provides for the transfer, modification or abolition of existing functions of the Lord Chancellor or for the exercise of those functions concurrently by another person—the concordat aspect. They are principally aimed at functions in primary legislation enacted since the introduction of this Bill or in secondary legislation or in prerogative instruments elsewhere.
	Clause 16 introduces schedule 6, about which the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is concerned, and which lists functions of the Lord Chancellor that cannot be transferred to anyone else. Those functions relate to the Great Seal, the judiciary, judicial appointments and the organisation of the courts. The clause allows the addition of functions to schedule 6 where those functions that have been transferred are modified by an order under clause 16, but the order-making power cannot be used to transfer, modify or abolish functions listed in that schedule. In other words, they give that protection to those particular aspects of the role of Lord Chancellor, and they are there to add that greater protection. That was the purpose of the amendments. They are a consequence of the concordat. I hope that that gives a little succinct clarity as to the nature of schedule 6.

Dominic Grieve: I am pleased that schedule 6 is present. As I understand the reasoning behind it, it is that the Government and the other place considered that there were functions discharged by the Lord Chancellor which were such that they should not be done by any other Minister. Some of those relate to administration, but have judicial aspects to them. The vast bulk of the list illustrates that.
	The Minister may agree with me that the schedule highlights the extent to which the Lord Chancellor, despite the changes that have been brought into being, continues to have important semi-judicial or at least administratively judicial functions which are not going to go away. In those circumstances, does the Minister agree that that highlights the need to ensure—something we shall come on to in a moment—that his position is made separate and distinct from that of other Ministers?

Christopher Leslie: I beg to move amendment No. 559, in schedule 6, page 150, line 6, at end insert 'and (c)'.

Christopher Leslie: As I have already said, schedule 6 protects certain judiciary, court and Great Seal-related functions of the Lord Chancellor. These functions cannot be transferred by order under clause 16 or by order under section 1 of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975. That is essential, given clause 4 and the Lord Chancellor's particular duties in relation to judicial independence. Amendments Nos. 463 to 465 provide for the addition to and deletion from schedule 6 of certain functions that the Lord Chancellor exercises in England and Wales. Amendments Nos. 559 to 561 amend schedule 6 to provide for the protection of certain judiciary or court-related functions that the Lord Chancellor exercises in Northern Ireland so that they cannot be transferred by an order under clause 16 or to another Minister by an order under the Ministers of the Crown Acts . They ensure that protection is afforded to those functions that the Lord Chancellor exercises in respect of Northern Ireland.
	Amendment agreed to.
	Government amendments made: Nos. 463, 560, 464, 465 and 561.
	Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments made: Nos. 52 to 54.
	Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments made: Nos. 55 and 56.
	Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister has not quite explained why, at a late stage of the Bill, it was felt necessary to introduce the new clause. It would be useful to understand the reasoning behind the Government's decision. The current position, as I understand it, is that if the Lord Chief Justice is incapacitated, there are all sorts of conventions in operation about other people discharging his responsibilities. I appreciate that as we move to a more statutorily based system, it is desirable to spell the procedure out in the Bill. Nevertheless, the Government did not originally choose to do that.
	The Bill was scrutinised at length in the other place, where the new clause was not inserted. I hope the Minister does not feel that I am pressing him needlessly. I am interested in trying to understand why, instead of the informal system that existed, the system is to be set out in statute. Perhaps he could also clarify why that was not done earlier in the passage of the Bill.

William Cash: This is an important issue relating to the functions of the Lord Chancellor. The issue of disqualification with respect to his having any future role raises questions that apply to the existing incumbent of that role and to those who may find themselves in a similar situation on any future occasion.
	Given the significance of the Lord Chancellor's role as described in the Bill, the early clauses, plus the other provisions that we have discussed today, make it clear that the Lord Chancellor has functions that, irrespective of the divorce of his role from the specifically judicial function, continue to have regard to the judicial question—

Dominic Grieve: May we take this opportunity to understand more fully what it is intended should happen if devolution of powers arrives in Northern Ireland? In those circumstances, would this responsibility transfer to a Northern Ireland justice Minister, or would it remain with the Lord Chancellor? I assume that the new clause has been introduced because such devolution has not occurred, but I would be grateful to the Minister if he clarified what the Government's intentions on this particular responsibility may be.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	It is necessary to return to some of the basic issues surrounding the Bill to understand why we tabled the new clause. The old structure of the Lord Chancellor provided, as we have debated peripherally this afternoon, that he was a judge first and foremost. He was a judge with a hybrid role, because as well as sitting as the head of the judiciary and a Law Lord, and being Speaker of the House of Lords, he was a Minister.
	As a Minister, one of the Lord Chancellor's duties was to ensure that the administration of justice and the court system operated correctly, so he was a departmental Minister. In addition to that he was—I believe that this expression has been used—the judge at the heart of Government, providing a moderating influence on colleagues in respect of the operation of the judicial system, if necessary, and sometimes legal advice. However, he did not do so in a formal sense, as the Attorney-General does, but informally, expressing an opinion if the rule of law was in danger of being undermined.
	The Lord Chancellor also had a role in protecting the judiciary when Ministers such as Home Secretaries got irritated that their Executive purposes were being thwarted by judicial decisions. As we know from the recent past with the previous Home Secretary—I have a funny feeling that we are beginning to see this with the current Home Secretary—the phenomenon is not unusual. I might add on a bipartisan basis that there have no doubt been previous Conservative Home Secretaries and others who at times felt equally frustrated by the judiciary's taking views of their decisions that they found unfortunate.
	Nevertheless, in a country where the rule of law prevails, it is of great importance that Ministers should accept judicial decisions, and more importantly, as the Minister will have no difficulty accepting, that they should not use their political status to try to undermine the judiciary. It is easy for those who are subject to political pressures—sometimes from an electorate who are irritated by judicial decisions—to move to a position where they covertly or overtly criticise judges and their decisions. If that happens in this country, we shall face a serious situation that we have so far succeeded in consistently avoiding.
	To illustrate the point, we could contrast that with the situation in France, a country that featured in yesterday's debate in relation to the merits of its judicial system. I remind the Minister that in a recent trial of a French Minister on serious charges of tax evasion and, I seem to remember, fraud, the situation became so bad that the judges trying the case said that they no longer felt safe to use the computers provided to them by the state to record their daily rendering of the case and their notes, because they were convinced that they were being hacked into. They started using their own laptops. There was a long litany of complaints about political interference in the judicial process. There were protectors of this Minister, or ex-Minister as he was by then. Indeed, he was the leader or chairman of a political party.
	I am sorry to say that that is not the only such problem that has arisen in France over the past 30 or 40 years. Mercifully, we have succeeded in avoiding such problems in this country. It may sometimes be said that our system of law is slower than those of other countries, and it can make mistakes; but the reputation for integrity of English and, for that matter, Scottish and Northern Irish judges is remarkably consistent, and has not been called into question. Judges' sagacity may occasionally be called into question, but not their integrity. That is largely owing to the absolutely accepted convention in Government that judges cannot be criticised, even if Ministers are hopping mad about what they have done.
	One of the problems of the changes envisaged in the Bill is the alteration of the Lord Chancellor's status from that of a judge in Government to that of any other Minister. He loses his judicial status—which we accept, because we recognise that he can no longer sit as a judge—but continues to have a unique role, which we highlighted when we discussed schedule 6: the role of carrying out functions that require him to behave as if he were a judge, and certainly to apply standards of independence and integrity. We also know that one of the reasons for the Government's accepting that the Lord Chancellor should take a particular oath when taking office, albeit not the original oath, is the fact that his role is different from that of every other Minister. We have debated what the terms of the oath should be, but I think there is a community of view throughout the Chamber that the Lord Chancellor has, or should have, a different status and oath.
	One question that has been discussed both in the other place and here is whether the Lord Chancellor should be a Minister who can sit in either House of Parliament, or whether he should sit only in the other place. The Government have strongly expressed the view that he should be capable of being a Minister in the House of Commons, whereas we—as I have said, and as the Minister knows—have argued long and hard that he should be a lawyer sitting in the House of Lords. It will be interesting to see, when the Bill returns to the House of Lords, what it will make of the amendments that we have made to the relevant part.
	We want the Lord Chancellor to be a lawyer in the House of Lords not because we think it is quite nice for him to be the Speaker in full fig on the Woolsack—although if the Lords wish him to be Speaker that will be possible—but because we think that it will provide at least a measure of further protection from the political interference that is, I fear, inevitable in a democratic Chamber where Members are likely to express, both privately and publicly, a range of sentiments on behalf of their constituents, including criticism of the judiciary. It is vital for the judiciary to be protected.

Dominic Grieve: I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his expression of support, because that is the intention. Given the way that public life works, in reality, the appointee might be someone of maturity, but that is not a bad thing. It is not a question of Eastbourne in ermine but of having a bit of experience of life and of politics and of having a good track record. That is exactly the benefit that past Lord Chancellors have given us, irrespective of which party they have come from. It is precisely to preserve that that we have tabled the new clause. Were the Government to accept it, it would go a long way towards meeting the criticisms that we have otherwise made about the danger of the Lord Chancellor being politicised, which, I think, would provide substantial reassurance. I hope that the Minister will respond positively.
	I do not want to see in 10 years' time—if the Government get their way on this Bill—someone who is effectively a junior ministerial appointment in the House suddenly realising that they are in fact at the mercy of the political pressures with which they will inevitably be surrounded. We should be sensible. One of the reasons why our political system has worked well to prevent impropriety is that it is robust. What the Minister is doing, with the changes that he is introducing, is making it much less robust in terms of the Lord Chancellor's independence. I realise that that is theoretical, but theory will usually turn into practice if the safeguards are not there. The new clause provides those safeguards, and I commend it to the House.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Gentleman says with complete confidence that no Lord Chancellor has ever held any other ministerial post; my officials and I will look back through the history books to double-check that assertion. [Interruption.] He says that it is impossible for a Lord Chancellor ever to hold another ministerial post, but he is wrong. He talks about convention, but it is he who proposes to put a statutory bar on former Lord Chancellors holding another ministerial post. I am simply discussing the proposal before the House.
	There would be other very significant disadvantages to such a statutory bar. For example, it might put the best person for the job off accepting it, if they felt that such a bar would be an artificial constraint on their future ministerial career. It would prevent that person from taking on any ministerial role—in which their skills and expertise might be of great value to the running of the country—even if it were blatantly obvious that they were the right choice for the post in, for example, a time of national emergency or crisis.
	There could be other perverse consequences for public affairs. For example, because a post-holder would not be able to hold any other ministerial post or perform any other role in public affairs, they would have a perverse incentive to hang on to their office. They might not resign at the time most others would consider appropriate, or when circumstances would normally suggest that they should. New clause 9 gives rise to all manner of oddities.

Simon Hughes: As I said a few moments ago, my hon. Friends and I will support new clause 9. The Minister knows that both Houses have supported the notion that the new Chancellor under the new arrangements should not have to be a member of the House of Lords, should not have to be a judge and can therefore be someone from either House. The Minister also knows that we would have preferred the title "the Minister of Justice", but we accept that the opening up of opportunities is generally a good thing.
	The argument that no special characteristics apply to the post does not hold up. For example, the Law Officers of the Crown have always been people who, in theory, could have been chosen from anywhere, but they have, in fact, been chosen from people with appropriate qualifications. The Minister of Justice under the new dispensation is someone who will for the first time be responsible to Parliament only for the justice system in this country—England and Wales in some respects and the whole of the United Kingdom in other respects. That is different from the present role.
	I agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr.   Grieve) that the job needs to be as protected as possible from the normal pressures of political aspiration and from the temptation to be popular with colleagues in order to obtain preferment. I cannot believe that, in future, there will not be people who would view it as a huge honour and privilege to serve for an indefinite term as the Lord Chancellor from either House of Parliament. I cannot believe that only an old person should be considered. I understand, in parenthesis, that Eastbourne has a declining average age rather than a rising one, and it may be a misrepresentation of Eastbourne to suggest that everyone there is old: indeed, there are many young people living there.

Simon Hughes: I acknowledge that the issue is debatable, but I have thought about it and I come down very strongly, when it comes to this particular job, on the side of protecting people from the usual pressures to give in to colleagues in order to be seen to be advancing a particular party view.
	Let us consider the present circumstances and a Bill such as this coming before Parliament, steered by the future Lord Chancellor, who could be a member of this House rather than the other place. Let us imagine that we are eight or nine weeks away from a general election and that a certain Bill faces the deadline that all its stages must be completed before Parliament is prorogued. Colleagues might exert all sorts of pressure to get the measure pushed through, but the compromises involved might not be in the interests of justice.
	The party and political pressures faced by the person who is Minister of Justice in all but name must be different from those faced by other office holders. The nature of democracy is that people are subject to such pressures, but the new system should provide protection for the person in that role.

Dominic Grieve: A story has been going around the Bar for some years that, when the present Lord Chancellor took office, the Lord Chief Justice suggested to him that, as he would not sit as a judge, it might be a mistake to take the judicial oath because it might cause him problems with his future career. I cannot but help think that one of the reasons why the Government resist this proposal so hard is the problem that it would pose to the present Lord Chancellor.

Alan Beith: I make no prediction about the duration in office of the present Lord Chancellor—I will not even quote what the Lord Chief Justice was alleged to have said about his many endearing qualities—but something quite important is at stake. We have probably lost the conventions during the argument. We are considering a Minister with a substantial Department that involves a lot of spending, and there may be a case of his sitting in the House of Commons and it may not be essential for him to be a lawyer. If we start to add all those things together, the convention could go out with the bathwater. It is a valuable convention for all the reasons that have been given—I do not want to repeat them—and I do not currently see any other way to safeguard it or to signal that we think it important than by supporting the new clause, so I intend to do so.

Ross Cranston: I congratulate the Opposition on raising this serious issue; but, on balance, they are wrong. I accept all that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has said about the need for my right hon. and hon. Friends to respect the judiciary, but mutual respect is needed. The judiciary itself must respect what Parliament has done and what the Executive do in accordance with our constitution, but there are three reasons why the Opposition are wrong on balance.
	First, we are recasting the office of Lord Chancellor in relation to the statutory obligations that we have already considered in clauses 1 and 4, and the obligations to protect the rule of law and respect the   independence of the judiciary. We are recasting the office in terms of the concordat, whereby the Lord Chief Justice, for example, has a much enhanced role. So the first reason is that the office has a different character.
	The second point is that there is no comparable provision in the other jurisdictions to which we might look. I know the situation in Canada and Australia best of all, and there is no suggestion that their Attorneys-General, who occupy a role that combines that of our Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor, are precluded from going on to other high ministerial office. The best example that I know is Sir Nigel Bowen, who was a Conservative Attorney-General in Australia. I worked with him very closely on an inquiry. He became the Australian equivalent of Foreign Secretary, and there is no suggestion that he in any way pulled his punches, while Attorney-General, in protecting the independence of the judiciary.
	The third reason is that convention is important—I agree with Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the Liberal Democrats in that respect—but we should allow such conventions to develop. A convention may develop that the people who occupy the role ought not to go on to accept other ministerial office. The great office of Lord Chancellor has changed over the centuries depending on the historical context. My hon. Friend the Minister is absolutely right to say that we ought not to stifle the development and evolution of that office as it faces new challenges.

Question accordingly negatived.
	It being more than five hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee, The Second Deputy Chairman, pursuant to Order [31 January], put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.
	New schedule 1 brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 647 and 648 made.
	Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 57 made.
	Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 58 to 80 made.
	Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.
	Government amendments Nos. 81 and 82 made.
	Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 83 to 87 made.
	Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 88 to 93 made.
	Clause 26, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 94 to 98 made.
	Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 99 to 102 made.
	Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clauses 29 and 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 103 and 104 made.
	Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 105 and 106 made.
	Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments 107 and 108 made.
	Clause 33, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 109 made.
	Clause 35, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 110 and 111 made.
	Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clauses 38 to 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 112 made.
	Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 113 to 115 made.
	Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 116 made.
	Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 117 made.
	Clause 46, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 118 to 122 made.
	Clause 47, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 123 to 125 made.
	Clause 49, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 126 made.
	Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 127 and 128 made.
	Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 52 disagreed to.
	Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 129, 649 and 650 made.
	Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
	Government amendment No. 130 made.
	Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	New clauses 31, 43 and 44 and new schedule 3 agreed to.
	Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 131, 651, 574, 652, 653, 132, 575, 133, 654 to 657, 134 to 141, 576 to 579, 142, 580, 143, 144, 581 and 145 to 175 made.
	Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 176, 582, 658, 659, 583, 660, 661, 177, 178, 640, 179 to 197, 584 and 198 to 202 made.
	Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 203 made.
	Clause 58, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 204 to 208, 585 and 209 made.
	Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 586 and 587 made.
	Clause 60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 588 made
	Clause 61, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 215 to 218 made.
	Clause 63, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 219, 589, 220, 590, 221, 591, 222, 223 and 592 made
	Clause 64, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 224 to 228 made.
	Clause 65, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 229 to 232 and 593 made.
	Clause 66, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Amendments made: Nos. 594 and 595.
	Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 596 made.
	Clause 68, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 237 to 240 made.
	Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 241, 597, 242, 598, 243, 599, 244, 245 and 600 made.
	Clause 71, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 246 to 250 made.
	Clause 72, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 251 to 254 and 601 made.
	Clause 73, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 602, 255, 603 and 256 made.
	Clause 74, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 662, 562, and 622 to 625 made.
	Schedule 12, as amended, agreed to.
	Clause 75 disagreed to.
	Government amendments Nos. 605 and 606 made.
	Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 262 to 265 made.
	Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 266, 607, 267, 608, 268, 609, 269, 270, 610 and 611 made.
	Clause 78, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 271 to 275 made.
	Clause 79, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 276, 612, 277, 278, 613, 279 and 614 made.
	Clause 80, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 280 and 281 made.
	Clause 81, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 82 disagreed to.
	Government amendments Nos. 616 to 618 made.
	Clause 83, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 285 to 288 made.
	Clause 84, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 289 made.
	Clause 85, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 290 made.
	Clause 86, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 291 to 293 made.
	Clause 87, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 294 made.
	Clause 88, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 295 to 298 made.
	Clause 89, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 299 and 300 made.
	Clause 90, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 301 made.
	Clause 91, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clause 92 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendment No. 302 made.
	Clause 93, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 303, 626 and 627 made.
	Clause 96, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 628, 304, 305, 629, 630, 307 and 631 made
	Clause 97, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 308, 632 and 309 made.
	Clause 98, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Government amendments Nos. 310 and 311 made.
	Clause 99, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Clauses 100 to 103 disagreed to.
	Government amendments Nos. 619, 620, 637 and 621 made.
	Clause 104, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	Motion made, and Question put, That new clauses 11 to 19, 21 to 25, 28 to 30 and 42 be read a Second time:—
	The House proceeded to a Division.

Edward Garnier: Further to that point of order, Sir Michael. The hon. Gentleman completed the point of order that I was intending to make to you during the Division. I fully accept that that was perhaps not the most convenient time to take it. Is there no procedure, however, whereby a Minister who introduces a guillotine motion to curtail debate on a Bill, and on this Bill in particular, can be required to explain himself after the event so that he can justify, after what he has done, what he intended to do beforehand?
	I presume that all Ministers come to the House with the good motive of wishing to allow the House ample time to discuss their legislation. Clearly, Sir Michael, you have been on your feet for nearly half an hour, which is probably the longest contribution that you have made on the Floor of the House since becoming a Deputy Speaker. I am delighted for you, but it is an abuse of our constituents and of our role as Members of Parliament, of which you are one, for a Government to deal with constitutional legislation, or any legislation, in this way. You may say that that is no more than a point of frustration, and not a point of order that you can deal with. None the less, the Government are increasingly abusing this place and we increasingly look to the Chair to protect us and the integrity of our procedures.
	I appreciate that you, Sir Michael, are as much a servant as a master of this House and that you must do what the House—through the Executive telling Parliament what to do—dictates. We live by this fiction that we in this place are free agents, and that being understood I urge you to apply some pressure to persuade the Government to behave themselves.

Peter Bottomley: In this spirit of comradeship, will the Minister accept that if the Government had thought before they spoke in creating this constitutional disarray—if they had asked the Lord Chancellor to agree not to sit as a judge and if they had agreed with the senior Law Lords that they should not take part in partisan debates—we would not have needed these provisions?

Jonathan Djanogly: We now find ourselves at the end of a full day of business on the Constitutional Reform Bill. Hon. Members have covered a certain amount of it as a Committee of the whole House, but more than half the clauses have not been considered today. Hundreds of clauses and amendments remain unconsidered and the Government have adopted amendments tabled by Back-Bench Members that have not even been debated. It may be an academic matter to protest now, but the Government can take no pride in their handling of the timetable for a Bill of such constitutional significance.
	This afternoon, some controversial proposals have been pushed through, among them provisions relating to the Lord Chancellor's oath, the speakership of the House of Lords, and the land charges search fees levied by local authorities. Of course, many of the clauses are not fundamentally in dispute as they deal with issues covered by the concordat between the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice. For example, the Opposition remain generally supportive of the judicial appointments commission—although, despite the wording in the Bill, we still fear the influence of a candidate's politics or crony potential on his or her chances of selection as a judge.
	As we have made clear from the outset, Opposition Members are not opposed to those aspects of the Bill that bring into force the sensible redefining of the relationship between the judiciary and the Government. However, the positive measures implementing the concordat do not make up for the serious damage that this Bill, in its entirety, will do to this country's delicate constitutional balance that has protected Britain's people and judiciary so effectively up to now. I maintain the view that I expressed on Second Reading. This Bill represents nothing less than constitutional vandalism in the way it sets out to replace the long-standing Appellate Committee of the House of Lords with an unnecessary supreme court, as well as in its undermining of the historical office of the Lord Chancellor.
	Indeed, the situation in relation to the Lord Chancellor has become much worse since Second Reading. The other place rightly saw fit to amend the Bill to require the holder of that position to be a member of the House of Lords and a person who had previously been a senior lawyer or judge. The argument for those requirements was entirely valid. They would ensure that the traditional upholder of the rule of law and the guardian of judicial independence had an understanding of the legal significance of events with which he or she might be confronted. By overturning those requirements, the Government have done nothing to further the rule of law that they purport, in clause 1, to uphold. Presumably, we are supposed to feel grateful that the Government have at least respected the Opposition amendment in another place that ensured that the position of Lord Chancellor remained in existence.
	As I said, a new supreme court is being thrust upon us. I make no apology for reiterating the effects of that proposal. The creation of such a court will guarantee only unnecessary upheaval and exorbitant costs. The principle of the separation of powers does not require such a change, and neither does the Human Rights Act 1998, which has not been used successfully to challenge our present position. No lack of integrity and independence on the part of the Law Lords necessitates such action. Contrary to what the Government have previously maintained, we believe that the role of the Law Lords is widely understood by the British public.
	A starting estimate of £30 million in set-up costs and an estimated £8.8 million in annual running costs will be required for the new court. By contrast, for a little over £168,000 a year, we already have a final appeal court in the Appellate Committee, which is admired at home and abroad for its authoritative rulings. The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary will be removed from Parliament, reducing the quality of debate and legislation in the other place. The Law Lords will lose the benefit of their existing location at the heart of government.
	The many reasons for opposing the Bill have been made quite clear throughout the debates in the House. The Government are modernising for the sake of it, and the Conservative party cannot go along with that. I ask the House to take what may be its final opportunity to vote against the Bill, which is damaging to our constitution and wasteful and unnecessary in practice.

Keith Vaz: I want to speak briefly on Third Reading because we have rehearsed the arguments over so many days and, indeed, a number of months from when the Government first published their proposals.
	I pay tribute to the Minister, who has conducted himself eloquently and tirelessly in ensuring that the House has an opportunity to be provided with as much information as possible, and he has done it all with good humour. I thank him for the work that he has done in ensuring that the Bill passes all its stages.
	I want to say how pleased I am that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister have worked so hard with the judiciary. Certainly, when these proposals were announced, some of those in the senior judiciary were concerned about some of them. There was concern in the judicial part of the House of Lords and a number of Law Lords were not consulted about what was happening. Since then, we have agreed the concordat with the Lord Chief Justice. I am glad that we worked with the judiciary because we have the finest judiciary in the world. It is important that the judiciary should be kept fully informed of the developments and properly consulted, and I now think that the judiciary support the reforms. I hope that the Minister will take the message from the House to those in the senior judiciary that we will consult them on matters that concern them and that we will ensure that we consider their views.
	What has saddened me tonight, however, is the   attitude of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr.   Grieve) and the Conservative party's decision to vote against diversity in the House. It is appalling that a party that claims to the black and Asian communities and on the gender issue that it is in favour of diversity should wish to vote against an innocuous clause proposed by the Government—new clause 42.

Keith Vaz: Hang on—wait a minute. The hon. Gentleman will attend an Asian function in the House this Saturday. He attended Baisakhi last year. I think that he even put a turban on his head in the middle of Baisakhi. He says to the ethnic minority community that his party is in favour of diversity, yet he comes to the House and votes against diversity. [Interruption.] He has had a lot to say. Let me just say that he should have known about the substance of clause 42 and we cannot do his homework for him. He is a clever man and I should have thought that he would have established what that clause was intended to do.
	First, it was originally proposed by myself, his hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston), who is, sadly, to retire from the House, despite his distinguished service in the Government and on the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs. It is obvious that when the three individuals concerned all signed the same proposal, it is worth reading and considering very carefully.
	Secondly, clause 42 comes straight from Northern Ireland legislation. It reflects exactly what was intended in respect of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission.

Keith Vaz: I will when I have finished making my point.
	The proposal has worked well in Northern Ireland and it was therefore appropriate to suggest it again. The third point is that the clause is specific on merit. No woman and no black or Asian person in this country wants to be appointed to any job on the basis of their colour or gender. The first and overriding consideration is merit, and that is exactly what clause 42 states. That is why it is written in terms that allow merit to be the overriding consideration.

Simon Hughes: May I first thank the Minister? Although the Liberal Democrats did not like the programme motion, nor the fact that we did not debate so much of the Bill, he dealt with matters today with his usual expertise, competence, courtesy and friendliness. We are grateful for that because it helps to alleviate the other criticisms, which we do not lay largely at his door.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) has had the conduct of the Bill through the House, except today, with the assistance of my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler). My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), who was in his place for most of the day and chairs the Constitutional Affairs Committee, gave his apologies as he had to be at another event now, but he has been assiduous in ensuring that the Committee and all its members played their full part in contributing to our deliberations. We owe them all our thanks.
	The hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) raised, with his usual intensity, new clause 42, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) and others. My colleagues and I supported that new clause and voted for it with enthusiasm. We believe that it should be added to the Bill, but I will not join the hon. Member for Leicester, East in criticising the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and his colleagues for saying that the new clause should have been debated in the House and in Committee. The Government did not say that they would support it. They are entitled to do so, but in the 27 minutes of unbroken recital of new clauses, new schedules and amendments, there was no chance to discuss any of them. It is proper to say that we should debate it.
	I accept that no woman or member of a minority ethnic community wants to be promoted within the legal profession on any grounds other than merit. I also accept the huge pool of talent that there was, is and will be from women and black and ethnic minority communities. I have held the strong view for many years that they have been under-represented by miles in judicial appointments at the highest level. Only in the last 12 months has the first woman made it to the most senior court in the land. That delay has done us no credit, but I am pleased that it has happened at last.
	None the less, we should have been able to have this debate and the new clause could then have been judged on its merits. That has been our view for a long time, and it is unreasonable to associate a lack of concern for these issues with the way in which the Conservative party voted on the issue.
	Turning to the matter of substance, the Bill is important and substantial—all 227 pages of it. I think that it is the last of the Bills envisaged under the Cook-Maclennan agreements made before the 1997 general election by the right hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) and my colleague Lord Maclennan of Rogart, as he now is. Our parties put forward a set of constitutional proposals that we said that we would want to introduce when either of us was in government. Labour was elected and did good things in its initial period in government, including passing the Human Rights Act 1998. That has been spoilt by the question of derogating, but that is a sad and separate story.
	The time has long come for the reforming proposal that lies behind the Bill. I do not think that in any other modern or older democracy throughout the world, the roles of the Speaker of one of the Houses of Parliament, a Minister in the Executive and the most senior judge have been fused and carried out by one person. It is absolutely proper to argue that the roles should be separated.
	I support a two-Chamber Parliament, with a principal Chamber and a second revising Chamber. In passing, may I say that I support a predominantly elected second Chamber and hope that we will have one before long? I think that that was on the Prime Minister's agenda at one point, but it has slipped a bit as he has changed his view in a retrograde way. It is self-evident that the two Chambers of Parliament should choose their own Speakers and call them what they want.
	Additionally, there should be a Minister of Justice—he will now still be called the Lord Chancellor—who is accountable to parliamentarians, one hopes in the elected House of Commons. That will be the case in the future. There should also be a separate, independent and free-standing supreme court for the United Kingdom. It should be seen as separate from legislative and party pressures and able to do its new job. That is not to say that the Law Lords have not done a good job. We value hugely what they did as recently as December when they found that the Government had acted illegally and that the law of this country was contrary to the European convention on human rights. They thus effectively called on us to repeal the law, which we will inevitably now do. However, in modern democracies, courts and supreme courts are separate from the legislature, and the Bill will allow us to achieve such separation.
	It is important that we modernise the way in which we appoint our judges. The system set out in the Bill is not perfect, but it is much better than the existing one. We will have an independent commission and independent scrutiny. I personally would have preferred a structure under which the nomination of the Prime Minister would also require approval by a Select Committee, as is the case in the American Congress, as well as involving the judicial commission process, because that would have provided for extra protection.
	The Bill changes ancillary matters to do with such matters as the Privy Council and its appellate functions. Those changes needed to be made, so it is right for us to modernise our judicial process.
	We need a judiciary that is modern, but above all independent. When Liberal Democrats have criticised the Bill, it has been because the Government have not adequately ring-fenced that independence—we had one such debate today. However, with a few reservations, we warmly welcome the Bill, so my colleagues and I will support it on Third Reading, as we have done throughout its passage. We hope that it will be on the statute book soon, whatever the date of the general election.

Edward Garnier: I am afraid that I cannot echo the enthusiastic praise for the Bill expressed by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes). I can, however, join in the general feeling of warmth shown towards the Minister, who has done his best in a difficult job. No doubt he had to comply with some pretty unattractive instructions, not least of which was ramming the Bill through Committee as quickly as possible with minimum inconvenience to the Government or anyone else, save for those who care about the courts, the office of Lord Chancellor and the creation of a judicial appointments commission.
	I shall make my next point briefly because I gather from a Government Whip that the Labour party wants to get away early, having done its business. I am sorry that food takes a greater precedence over a debate on an important constitutional issue, but that is the Parliament we now have.
	The judicial appointment commission is unnecessary, but it is the least harmful of the measures. The supreme court is an utterly unnecessary and hugely expensive way of so-called reforming the highest appeal court in our land. It is no more than an artificial way of resolving a dispute between the former Home Secretary and the former Lord Chancellor. It has produced a great deal of sadness and upset, and no identifiable benefit. I do not buy the line produced by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that it is necessary to have the highest court of appeal outside Parliament. No one who has thought about that for more than 30 seconds has ever thought that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords was anything other than a court and that its judgments were anything other than legal judgments, rather than political speeches, but the majority have had their day and that is the end of that, at least until we know the result of the general election.
	On the Bill's contents—this is allied to my remarks on the supreme court—the office of the Lord Chancellor, in every sense of the word as it has been understood for many years, has been destroyed. The description of the pubic office that will be wrapped with the words "Lord Chancellor" is unrecognisable to anyone who has any interest in the history of the office. Indeed, in another guise it is possible that the Government could be sued for passing off the post-Bill Lord Chancellor as the Lord Chancellor. He is nothing of the sort.
	There is some importance attached to that position beyond the point about the new role of the Lord Chancellor. He has traditionally been the protector of the rule of law, the protector of the judiciary against political interference, and upholder of the independence of the judiciary at the highest levels of government. Of course, that will go because he will not be anything other than a political Secretary of State, and good luck to him. He will not, however, have the authority, either as a politician and still less as the head of the judiciary, to speak for it on such issues. We will have to rely on the Attorney-General who, at the moment, is a Member of the other place.
	I am sad to say that we no longer have lawyers on the Labour Benches who appeal to the Prime Minister and are up to doing the important job of the Law Officer in this House. I regret the fact that the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) is no longer the Solicitor-General. He was extremely good at it. He was not an aggressive "punch you in the face" politician. He made the grave mistake of thinking about what he wanted to say before he said it, which did not necessarily appeal to the Government.
	At the moment we are blessed with the right hon. and   learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) as our Solicitor-General. No doubt she will long be in that office, and, if not long in that office, long remembered for her tenure of that office. However, I cannot put much faith in the Attorney-General's ability to protect the judiciary and uphold the rule of law when he suggested in the House of Lords today that the so-called précis of his advice on the legality of the invasion of Iraq was not a précis of anything that he ever said or wrote. It is extremely worrying that that is the quality of person who currently holds that office—irrespective of the Attorney-General's other merits—and that that is the state of affairs in which we find ourselves. I am not sure that I want to trust the independence of the judiciary to that sort of muddle.
	I have said quite enough about the content of the Bill, and I want briefly to comment on the process by which we have reached its Third Reading. You, Mr. Speaker, will not have been present during the Committee stage, but will no doubt have had reported to you the fact that one of your deputies spoke for about half an hour simply to read out a list of clauses, amendments and other procedural material that we had no opportunity to debate. I congratulated him on making his longest contribution to the House since he became a Deputy Speaker. It is utterly regrettable that the House should allow itself to debate without proper consideration a book that claims to be a Bill and is as long and as thick as it is.
	Those points are reinforced by what happened yesterday in this place, when we had to discuss the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in undue haste and when, in my submission, the procedures of this place were roundly abused by the Executive and the majority of Members of Parliament were prepared to let it happen, as they have again today. I do not know, Mr. Speaker, whether there is anything that we can realistically do about this suborning of the proper processes of deliberation in this place.
	I am surprised that a Government with a majority of 165 do not have the self-confidence to allow their ideas, policies and legislation to be discussed and tested. It seems to me that a majority of 165 should allow a Government to be generous in their accommodation of other people's arguments, because they always know that they will win—that the compliant majority will deliver—and ought occasionally to do the decent thing and listen to arguments that they find unattractive. [Interruption.] I am hearing sedentary remarks from across the Chamber to the effect that tummies are rumbling, so I shall stop now and allow those Members to go away, enjoy whatever dinner it is that they wish to go to, and think a little more about the possibility that if they are re-elected, either as individuals or collectively, they may be forced to consider whether they have properly fulfilled their functions as Members of Parliament in holding the Executive to account. My view is that they have not, but should, and my concern is that this Bill and these proceedings are evidence of a total thoughtlessness—indeed, reckless disregard—for the people of this country in terms of how this House produces legislation.
	I wish the House of Lords every opportunity to think hard about the Bill and to restore some common sense and constitutional propriety to our parliamentary procedures.

Harriet Harman: I welcome the subject that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) has chosen for this debate, and I acknowledge, as he has done, the deep interest of my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) in the matter, and his commitment to these issues. Both my hon. Friends have already taken the opportunity to convey to me the sense of injustice that their constituents feel about the sentences in the cases that have been raised tonight.
	I was not surprised to see the subject that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North had chosen. Both he and my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling take a close interest in the question of crime and justice for their constituents. They focus not only on the question of sentences—which we are debating tonight—but on the fear of crime and on the effective response to crime by the police, prosecutors and courts that their constituents want, and to which they are entitled. Because of my hon. Friends' representations on the concerns of their constituents, I am in a better position than I would otherwise have been to understand the context of crime in Nottingham, which is where the impact of the Court of Appeal's sentencing decisions in these cases has been most deeply felt.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North has argued for three things: first, for the courts to take into account the effect of their sentences on public confidence and, in particular, for the Court of Appeal to take into account the effect on public confidence locally of any reduction in a sentence that it might make; secondly, for more scope for—and public engagement in—a decision of the Law Officers to refer an unduly lenient sentence, along with a broad approach rather than a narrow legalistic one; and thirdly, for the opportunity to appeal an unduly lenient sentence when it is believed to have been imposed not by the court at first instance but following an appeal by the defendant against their sentence.
	First, does the Court of Appeal take into account the effect of its sentence on public confidence? The answer is yes it does, and rightly so. Its sentence is important not only for the defendant and the victim in that case but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North graphically illustrated, for the wider public There are many occasions on which judges, at first instance, rightly explain how they have had regard to the effect on public confidence in respect of a particular type of offence, a particular type of victim or a particular locality when they impose a sentence. That is helpful not just for the defendant, victim and local community to understand how the sentencing decision has been reached, but if the defendant appeals against the sentence to the Court of Appeal, that Court can see in the papers why the judge took his or her view at first instance. It is also helpful for Law Officers, when we consider whether a sentence is unduly lenient, to see what considerations have been taken into account when a judge is sentencing, including whether he or she has recognised the effect on public confidence. The Court of Appeal will often reflect in its judgment its concerns for public confidence in the local community in the criminal justice system in relation to its sentencing decisions.
	Secondly, one of the important developments in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service handles cases is that prosecutors understand the importance of bringing to the attention of the court, in the sentencing exercise, the effect of a crime in a particular community, as well as challenging any factual errors in mitigation. It used to be felt that the prosecution's job was done as soon as the conviction had been obtained. Now prosecutors better understand that they have a role in bringing out the features of the case to assist the judge in sentencing and in challenging any wrong facts that might be put forward in mitigation. Helping the courts in the sentencing exercise is an important new role for prosecutors. When they do that at first instance, those points will be in the transcripts considered by the Court of Appeal should the defendant appeal.
	On the issue of Members having the opportunity to prompt the review of a sentence, may I start by reminding the House how the unduly lenient sentence regime works? Anyone can refer a sentence to the Attorney-General or me and ask us to refer it to the Court of Appeal, even a member of the public, someone from a different part of the country or someone not involved in the case. Anyone can ask us to consider a case. Our jurisdiction, when a case has been brought to our attention, is simple: we have the power to refer a sentence from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal if we think that it is unduly lenient. It is not restrictive, nor do we interpret it restrictively, and it does not exclude any considerations. The only stipulation in the statute is the time limit—that we must refer the sentence to the Court of Appeal within 28 days. I therefore reassure my hon. Friends that setting out criteria in statute on what should be taken into account would not be of assistance. We step back, examine the sentence in the public interest and ask ourselves whether it is unduly lenient. It is as simple as that.
	This is a very special jurisdiction. Parliament gave Law Officers the right to refer a sentence in order to ensure that sentences that are manifestly wrong, that would undermine public confidence in the community and that would undermine confidence in the judiciary, can be reviewed by the Court of Appeal.
	What happens in the process? The facts of the case are agreed, and the case goes to the Court of Appeal. The offender is represented by counsel, and I or the Attorney-General are represented by Treasury counsel. In some cases, the Attorney-General has himself acted on a reference. The court will have before it all the case papers, including the victim impact statement, which should always have been put before the court in the first instance of sentencing. In other words, it should always be in the case papers before the Court of Appeal, which will always take them into consideration.The Court of Appeal will then judge whether the sentence is unduly lenient, and it can either confirm it as it is, or increase it. This jurisdiction is a safety valve to ensure public confidence and justice in individual cases.
	The Attorney-General and I regard that power as one of the most important that we exercise, and we exercise it in the public interest, not on the Government's behalf. In every case that comes before us, we personally consider the file, the advice of Treasury counsel, and the advice of the lawyers in our excellent legal secretariat. It is very much open to any Member to ask us to look into a case and to consider referring it to the Court of Appeal. There is no need for Members to ask the chief Crown prosecutor to consider a case, although they can do so. Instead, they can come straight to us, and many do. Indeed one Member brought a case to my attention during the last Solicitor-General's questions, and after closely examining, it I did indeed refer it to the Court of Appeal as involving an unduly lenient sentence.
	My hon. Friend asked what happens when a sentence is felt at first instance to be fair and not unduly lenient, but the defendant then appeals and the Court of Appeal, which is that much further away from the community that cares most about the case, reduces the sentence to such an extent that people feel that it is now unduly lenient. On the right to appeal against an unduly lenient sentence by the Court of Appeal as referred by the Law Officers, such an appeal can only concern a point of law, but it can be made to the House of Lords. As far as I am aware, that has never actually happened, but it is possible and such provision is made in statute. Law Officers can appeal against a Court of Appeal's unduly lenient sentence.
	My hon. Friend asked me how that could work in respect of an appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision on a defendant's appeal against sentence. He has invited me to reflect on this point about an appeal against a sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal in an appeal by the offender against sentence—that sounds somewhat circular, but my hon. Friend will get the point—and I undertake to reflect further and write to him about it.
	Perhaps I can conclude by assuring my hon. Friends the Members for Nottingham, North and for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) that I am acutely aware of their concern that the justice system should command the confidence of their constituents, and that the Attorney-General and I will continue to consider with the greatest attention their and their colleagues' representations about sentencing on their constituents' behalf.

Graham Allen: My right hon. and learned Friend has been very generous in saying that she will think about this issue and write to us. Will she make a point of discussing it with the judges at the Court of Appeal, so that they understand that we are not trying to attack their Lordships in this regard? Rather, we want to pick their brains and to ensure that they do what I am sure that they wish to do: relate their judgments to the community impact.